Informal networks: the invisible drivers of corruption and implications for anti-corruption practice
Informal networks: the invisible drivers of corruption and implications for anti-corruption practice
Claudia Baez-Camargo, Saba Kassa and Cosimo Stahl
The need to rethink conventional anti-corruption
Conventional anti-corruption approaches advocate for the adoption of legal and institutional reforms in line with international best practices. Nevertheless, these anti-corruption frameworks are often weakly implemented across the Global South. Overcoming these limitations invites the rethinking of some of the core assumptions of anti-corruption practice, which has mainly aimed to address poor accountability and weak law enforcement capabilities of the state. A promising perspective brings in the dimensions of sociality and informality to shed light on context-specific factors, such as social norms and informal power structures, that are associated with high levels of corruption.
Informal Networks Drive Corrupt Behaviours
Two of our research projects have evidenced the role of informal social networks in fuelling corruption. At the grassroots, social networks are key to solving problems on the basis of an economy of favours that seamlessly penetrates the public sector. Top-down, grand corruption is perpetuated by networks of elites that engage in mutually favourable exchanges to promote their respective interests, in the process effecting an informal re-distribution of public resources.
The power of sociality
Our first research project revealed the links between social norms, social networks and petty corruption in the delivery of public health services in Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda. Social norms that prescribe the obligation of sharing with one’s group and reciprocating received gifts and favours translate into practices of embezzlement, bribery and favouritism when transposed into the realm of public service delivery.
Thus, health workers reported experiencing enormous pressure to exploit their positions to acquire resources on behalf of their next of kin.
“it’s not that we have a lot of money to help five or six relatives, but […] whatever you get you share with others” (Health worker, Tanzania).
Favouritism is also a common occurrence associated with the expectation that service providers must give preferential treatment to their networks, as happens often in the Tanzanian and Ugandan health sectors.
“Your relative must be given priority if there is not an emergency, my mother, father, son or daughter come first.” (Health worker, Uganda).
The salience of the social norms is particularly clear in the case of Rwanda, where the regime’s zero tolerance approach to corruption is enforced with severe punishments. Even there, health service providers feel compelled to give preferential treatment to their networks because of the social sanctions that ensue when someone refuses.
“… [there are] consequences associated with not serving the neighbour or one of your family members, even when the situation does not allow [you to do so].” (Health worker, Rwanda).
Evidence from Tanzania and Uganda also illustrates how gift giving and bribery are proactively used to recruit “helpful” service providers into users’ networks in order to expedite access to services.
“you have to get a musawo nga mukwanogwo (health worker who is your friend).”
(Service user, Uganda).
The normalisation of these practices entails that bribes, favours or gifts exchanged in the context of service delivery enjoy social acceptability, which stands in stark contrast to formal rules, rights and entitlements which are considered to be useless and unfair. Thus, the practices of the informal networks constitute a pragmatic safety net, providing highly valued resources to solve problems, many of which relate to the poor quality and accessibility of available public services. Of course, widespread practices of embezzlement, favouritism and bribery are themselves cause for deficient health services. However, the Rwandan case also shows that reliance on extensive social networks is strongly mitigated when access to quality public services improves. In Tanzania and Uganda, networks are extensive because there is a perception that without them, accessing services is simply not possible; in Rwanda, by contrast, binding social networks are limited to the close family.
Informal governance among elites
Our second research project enquired into the role of informal practices in countries that experience high levels of corruption in spite of having adopted the legal and institutional reforms associated with international best practices. Comparative evidence from Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Tanzania and Uganda indicates that political elites also proactively build networks based on reciprocity, loyalty and trust because they are effective to promote their interests.
Ruling elites co-opt strategic individuals (on the basis of kinship, tribal identity, region of origin or ability to mobilise constituencies and resources) to encourage elite cohesion, nurture bases of support and weaken opponents. Across the five countries, recruitment into the ruling networks typically involves appointments into positions of power and influence, where an unwritten rule prescribes unconditional support to the regime in exchange for impunity in exploiting public authority for private gain.
Horizontal co-optation, which is the practice of recruiting friendly business groups into the ruling network, similarly involves reciprocal exchanges and is also common across our cases. An indicative example involves private interests providing resources to fund electoral campaigns in exchange for large government contracts or other undue benefits.
One of the features of this network-based informal governance is that, while it is extremely effective in nourishing bases of support and neutralising opponents, it also has a significant lock-in effect. Thus, the successful network leader becomes powerful but in doing so also becomes entrapped by the obligations to safeguard the interests of the network. Such findings cast a new light on the problem of lack of political will in the fight against corruption.
The research findings also show that political liberalisation is associated with an expansion of informal networks as it entails that more potential opponents need to be co-opted and that the financial costs of contending for elective office increase significantly. Indeed, transitions to multi-party elections are associated in our dataset with sizeable increases in the levels of corruption. This suggests that there might be trade-offs between initiatives that seek to promote democracy and those aimed at combatting corruption, underscoring the need to incorporate empirical evidence into development programming in order to avoid unintended consequences.
Harnessing Sociality and Informality for Anti-Corruption
Our research indicates that powerful elites and citizens alike construct networks to “get things done” through practices that informally re-distribute access to public resources. This goes a long way in explaining the persistence of corruption when it is associated to the instrumental actions of a broad range of collectively colluding actors.
At least two major actionable implications emerge from these insights.
First, networks operate to the benefit of insiders but generate huge costs to outsiders. Thus, promoting initiatives that help construct networks among the groups that overwhelmingly suffer the costs of corruption is important. In a current follow-on research project, we are exploring legal reforms that may open spaces to allow networks of anti-corruption champions to more effectively denounce and resist corruption.
Second, other research increasingly suggests that social networks are powerful vehicles to diffuse behavioural change. Thus, although social networks may fuel and perpetuate corruption, it is possible that they can also be harnessed to promote anti-corruption. Thus, exploring the potential of peer-driven interventions that work with locally held norms of solidarity and reciprocity to change behaviours by exposing the hidden costs of corruption and empowering its victims is another key area that appears to be particularly promising.
Dr Claudia Baez Camargo is Head of Governance Research at the Basel Institute on Governance/ University of Basel.
Cosimo Stahl is a Public Governance Specialist at the Basel Institute on Governance.
Saba Kassa is a Public Governance Specialist with the Basel Institute on Governance.
The research on which this blog is based has been funded by the UK government’s Department for International Development (DFID) through the British Academy/DFID Anti-Corruption Evidence Programme and through the East Africa Research Fund (EARF). However, the views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the DFID or the British Academy.